Introductory Remarks: An Analytical Framework for Thinking About Economic Justice by Peritz, Rudolph J.R.
NYLS Law Review 
Vols. 22-63 (1976-2019) 
Volume 46 
Issue 3 Reflecting on the Legal Issues of Our 
Times: New York Law School Faculty 
Presentation Day 
Article 21 
January 2003 
Introductory Remarks: An Analytical Framework for Thinking 
About Economic Justice 
Rudolph J.R. Peritz 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/nyls_law_review 
 Part of the Law and Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Rudolph J. Peritz, Introductory Remarks: An Analytical Framework for Thinking About Economic Justice, 
46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. (2002-2003). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in NYLS Law Review by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS. 
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\46-3-4\NLR422.txt unknown Seq: 1 20-FEB-03 10:09
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS:
AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THINKING
ABOUT ECONOMIC JUSTICE
RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ1
What is economic justice? It certainly means something to our
three speakers this afternoon,2 and I suspect that economic justice
means something to each one of you. Everyone from Marie Antoinette
to Karl Marx has had an opinion about economic justice—whether it
was “Let them eat cake” or “From each according to his ability; to each
according to his need.”
In trying to make sense of this open-textured idea, I did what any
21st century person would do. I went to the Internet. I surfed the net
for signs of economic justice. After precisely .09 seconds, the Google
search engine returned 104,000 hits on the phrase “economic jus-
tice”,3 including the following: There was an Institute for Economic
Justice and Indigenous Technologies as well as a local exchange about
1. Pennsylvania State University, B.S. 1969; University of Texas, J.D. 1975 (Texas
International Law Journal). Langdell Fellow, Harvard Law School, 1981-82. Expert in
antitrust law, particularly in matters involving information technology, as well as eco-
nomic regulation, jurisprudence, and information technology and the law. In private
practice was consultant on computer-related cases and complex litigation. Worked as
computer programmer, systems engineer, Assistant Attorney General of Texas in Anti-
trust Division, and Senior Research Scholar, American Antitrust Institute. The text is a
lightly edited transcription of my introductory remarks at the “Economic Justice” ses-
sion of Faculty Presentation Day, New York Law School (Apr. 3, 2002).
2. Ed Samuels, who later spoke about the forgotten equities of performers, stated
that he wrote his paper before the panel was organized and, impliedly, did not necessa-
rily have any particular notion of economic justice in mind. Indeed, it was Associate
Dean Steve Ellmann who organized the panel under the rubric of economic justice. But
that should not concern us, particularly in light of post-structuralist notions of the au-
thor, especially the so-called reader-response criticism associated with such literary crit-
ics as Stanley Fish, himself the author of the (in)famous Is There a Text in the Class?
(STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THE CLASS? (Harvard University Press 1983)).
Reader-response critics insist that a text is little more than an inkblot that allows readers
to project their interpretive frameworks into texts, texts that by their nature are open to
all manner of interpretation. So there is nothing to stop us from reading Samuels’
paper through the lens of economic justice, even if the lens is not of his making. As an
aside, what might that account of interpretation have to say about the uniqueness and
originality of texts and other copyrightable materials?
3. Google.com is currently the most popular Internet search engine.
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fair trade, whose motto is Shop Without Sweatshops. There was an eco-
nomic justice network that had a specialized search engine for eco-
nomic reform called “Ask Henry”. I wondered whether there was a
physical namesake, a human forerunner for the virtual Henry but did
not take time to satisfy my curiosity. I found centers of economic jus-
tice in California, North Carolina, Vermont, Texas, Washington, D.C.,
and Arkansas. The D.C. center won my out-of-touch-with-the-fact-that-
William Jennings Bryant-lost-three-times-a-hundred-years-ago award for
its guiding principle that economic justice requires a return to a gold
or silver monetary standard. I found Jews for Racial and Economic Jus-
tice, as well as an “Economic Justice for All” Pastoral Letter written by
the U.S. Catholic Bishops in the mid-1980s, an Economic Justice Loan
Committee of the Episcopal Church, and, of course, an Ecumenical
Coalition for Economic Justice—which was formerly known as “GATT-
fly”. Citizen coalitions for economic justice exist in Korea and Japan.
And there is the Women’s International Coalition for Economic Jus-
tice right here in New York City.
What sense can be made of so much economic justice—from
Marx to Marie Antoinette to the Internet? Perhaps the best we can
hope for is an analytical structure or framework for thinking, if not
about economic justice writ large, then about the three papers that
follow. Here is a framework, writ small, that you might find useful for
our session today.
Let’s begin by isolating the “justice” part of economic justice. Jus-
tice often refers to legal rights, particularly to fairness or equity in the
substance and enforcement of those rights. The idea is to treat equals
equally and unequals unequally — but only in proportion to their rele-
vant differences. So much hinges on the controversial question of rele-
vant difference. What differences are relevant? Differences are relevant
when the criterion of distinction is fair, a notion that goes back at least
to Aristotle. When distinctions are seen as unfair, e.g., distinctions
based on race and gender, then we call them “discrimination”. Much
of modern debate over economic justice has to do with the question of
fairness in the making of distinctions.
Economic justice has something to do with fairness in economic
matters. And so I want to develop a rudimentary framework for think-
ing about economic fairness. It seems to me that questions of eco-
nomic fairness can entail three inquiries: fairness of process, fairness of
outcome, and appropriate level of inquiry.
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Economic justice can be a matter of fair process. For some, fair
economic process is a minimalist notion of maintaining open access to
an unfettered process. In western common law countries, that has
often been understood to mean a process free of government interfer-
ence. For others, a more capacious conception of fair process requires
some supervision, typically by government, to assure the conditions for
meaningful access and participation.4 In the United States, we can see
both views in the idea of free competition when we ask the question:
From what do we want to free competition? On the one hand, we want
to unfetter competition from oppressive government power. On the
other hand, we also want to free competition from private economic
domination — and sometimes we need government to help us in that
endeavor. In consequence, these two views of fair process, of competi-
tion on the merits, can sometimes conflict with one another.5 Eco-
nomic justice as fair process is not an easy matter.
The second aspect of economic justice reflects differing ideas
about fair outcomes rather than fair process. I want to mention five
well-known ideas about fair outcomes.
First, an outcome might be considered fair when there is arithme-
tic equality. For example, when Beaver Cleaver’s Mom cut that apple
pie, everyone got a slice of equal size. That was only fair. Second, many
consider outcomes fair only when the process is seen as a meritocracy,
and those who have earned the benefits get them. Third, fair outcomes
might entail apportionment according to need. In his influential book,
The Theory of Justice (1971), political philosopher John Rawls conjures
an economic decision-making process whose criterion for action is that
the least-well-off must benefit. Fourth, there is the utilitarian approach,
which holds that outcomes are fair when, on balance, gains outweigh
losses. The identity of individual winners and losers, the conditions of
gain and loss, and the amount of losses are all immaterial. Tradition-
ally, the gains and losses in this approach refer to a subjective notion of
personal satisfaction but they can also refer to wealth or gender equal-
ity or to anything else, for that matter. Economists tend to prefer
wealth as the value because they are trained to view the world in terms
of markets and because using wealth, they claim, allows for easier mea-
surement of gains and losses. Fifth and finally, some consider out-
4. These notions reflect English philosopher Isaiah Berlin’s well-known concep-
tualizations of negative and positive liberty.
5. I discuss these matters at some length in, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA:
HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAW (Oxford University Press, 1996 & rev. ed. 2001).
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comes to be fair when no one is worse off and at least one person is
better off. This view of economic justice is attributed to Italian sociolo-
gist Wilfredo Pareto and is called “Pareto optimality”. Here, too, the
traditional standard for gains and losses is personal satisfaction.
All five of these standards for thinking about fair outcomes as the
framework for economic justice cannot escape the controversial re-
quirement of defining the criteria: What are relevant differences? How
do you define merit or need? What is personal satisfaction? These are
all political questions in the large sense that call for value judgments.
Sometimes, the value judgment is explicitly stated and argued. At
other times, it is adopted implicitly, perhaps because it is seen as self-
evidently correct, as neutral, or as a majoritarian sentiment that should
bind us all. Finally, there are times when policy makers fail to recog-
nize the presence of value judgments. When is it that we can reasona-
bly demand explicit recognition and defense of value judgments?
In addition to the notions of fair process and fair outcomes, there
is a third aspect of economic justice. This third aspect relates to the
level of inquiry for process and outcome evaluation. Do you look at
individuals or at groups to determine economic justice? If groups,
which ones? Do you think in terms of race, class, gender, ethnicity, age,
sexual preference, or other identification criteria? What of geography
as a guide—local, state, regional, national, multilateral, global? For ex-
ample, wealth and personal satisfaction balancings could tip in differ-
ent directions. Moreover, a balancing of wealth gains and losses could
play out quite differently when comparisons are made across age
groups or when geographic contexts are shifted from local to global.
In sum, different levels of inquiry can produce different conclusions
about the fairness of process or outcome.
I will end with an observation: All three aspects of economic jus-
tice reveal gaps, ambiguities, contradictions, and overlaps, as well as
other difficulties for making decisions. As you read the papers that fol-
low, think about their spoken and unspoken assumptions about eco-
nomic justice, their criteria for fairness, and the importance of process
and outcome. Pay attention to their levels of inquiry. Where do you
agree and where do you take issue with their treatment of the subject
matter? And finally, where do you come out on questions of economic
justice?
